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Abstract
For the study of economic integration, it is costumary to use a three country world,
where two of the countries may introduce forms of closer economic cooperation. In
the present model, we follow this tradition but put special emphasis on the role of
credit and entrepreneurship. Our model is of the standard neoclassical type, with the
addition that production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. Also, firms must use
the financial system in order to buy inputs; the cost of credit may differ among countries
and industries, reflecting their basic patterns of uncertainty.
Following the Newbery-Stiglitz approach, we show that in such model we may
exhibit cases of Pareto inferior trade and, in particular, Pareto inferior economic
integration. More specifically, we show that integrating countries of very different
economic size may give rise to adverse effects on welfare, whereas integration of
countries with a more similar economic structure and size tends to have beneficial
effects for the parties.
Keywords: trade, uncertainty, Pareto inferior trade, regional integration.
JEL classification: F11, F15, F34
1. Introduction
In recent years, economic integration has been a main theme of both research and
policy, and new instances of economic integration of countries into free trade areas or
costums unions are presented each year, whether in connection with the expansion of the
European Union or the formation of free trade areas in America.
While initially economic integration was largely a question of abolishing or dimin-
ishing tariffs within the cooperating family of countries (see the classical contributions
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of e.g. Viner (1953) and Vanek (1965)), the ongoing process of trade liberalization has
to some extent shifted focus to other aspects of economic integration. This is supported
by the experience that there is limit to what trade liberalization can do for the countries,
as seen both in the unification of the two Germanies and after the formation of NAFTA.
Consequently, there is a need for a better understanding of what is actually being achieved
in the cause of economic integration. Some of the important aspects of economic integra-
tion, namely those related to credit and investment, have been less intensively studied than
those related directly to commodity trading, and the role of the institutions which are used
for these purposes (financial markets, intermediaries) have only been objects of theoretical
studies in later years. Therefore, adding these features to models of international trade
will often produce surprising results, such as the case of Pareto inferior trade presented by
Newbery and Stiglitz (1984).
In order to have financial markets in the model, it must contain a time dimension,
running over at least two periods of time. And if the credit institutions are to be of non-trivial
nature, there should be some form of uncertainty in the first period about outcomes in the
second period. This means that we need a model of international trade under uncertainty,
and presumably with less than full information; as it emerges, information asymmetry is
not needed to obtain the conclusions, which follow from the structural properties of the
model alone.
Models of international trade under uncertainty is of course no novelty, they have been
used actively at least since the seminal work by Helpman and Razin (1978). However,
in the model to be developed the emphasis is on the financial markets and their impacts
on commodity allocation. In particular, we consider situations where financial markets
prevent small (in a sense to be made precise) countries from reaping benefits of economic
integration.
The model follows the tradition of international trade theory in dealing with a world
where two commodities are produced from two inputs, using a technology which is known
to everybody. However, we depart slightly from tradition in allowing for entrepreneurship,
even if in a very crude way: There is a given number of firms or entrepreneurs, but an
entrepreneur may choose to produce either of the two commodities, and, in connection
with an economic integration, to operate the firm in another country; thus the distribution
of firms producing one or the other commodity is an equilibrium outcome of the model.
The point of this way of introducing entrepreneurship is that the progress expected from
economic integration would be that domestic firms get a larger share of world production,
rather than that foreign firms establish branches in the country to exploit cheap production
factors.
We study equilibria under different assumptions on the rules for international
cooperation. Throughout the paper, we assume that there is free international trade in
commodities, while factors of production cannot be traded between countries; as mentioned
above, firms of one country may however operate in another country, at least under suitable
2
regimes of economic integration, thereby achieving results which are similar to moving
the factors of production. In the definition of equilibria, we assume that consumers choose
savings under assumptions on the (random) yield of bonds which are rational in the sense
that they are confirmed by actual performance.
The markets for bonds issued by firms of a given country play an important role,
and since the performance is determined by the outcome of the firms which belong to
the country, their repayment rates are expressions of the country risk which again has
to do with the economic size of the country; since output shocks are independent, the
variance of output produced by firms of that country will be smaller, the larger its number
of firms, and the lower will be the repayment rate at which the bond will be demanded by
the consumers. Thus, country risk is connected with economic size or strength, and an
economic integration which allows for operation of one country’s firms in another country,
while retaining country-specific bond markets, may result in a situation where the smaller
country’s firms close down while its factors of production are employed in firms belonging
to the larger country. This is the case of disadvantageous integration; it does not arise when
the participating countries are of comparable size.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model, which is
a standard simple trade model over two periods and with uncertainty. The uncertainty
comes from independent and identically distributed output shocks in the firms, and it
affects second period output and consumption as well as the payoff of the bonds used
to finance the investment in production factors needed to produce the outcome. In the
following section, we consider the special case of constant returns to scale in production;
here equilibrium profits are zero, and the workings of the model become more transparent,
but on the other hand it fails to illustrate the role of the entrepreneur, which does not then
play an essential role. In Section 4, we treat the more general case of nonincreasing returns
to scale, opening up for nonzero profits as well as a choice of industry by entrepreneurs.
Having treated the basic features of the model, we may then turn to what was its purpose,
namely the study of economic integration, which is done in Section 5; here we show that in
certain cases (namely such where all other, trade-related, effects of integration are netted
out) integration between economically strong (in the sense of having many firms) and
weak (few firms) countries will have unfavorable effects for the latter, whereas economic
integration by more evenly situated countries will be welfare improving for both. Section
6 contains some concluding comments; the proof of the equilibrium existence result stated
in Section 3 is given separately in an appendix.
2. The model
We consider a model of trade based on the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
model with two produced commodities and two productive factors. We shall assume that
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there are three (and not two, as is usual in trade models) countries, since we shall consider
a situation where two countries integrate while leaving the third outside. The countries
are assumed to be identical with respect to producers’ and consumers’ characteristics but
they may differ in size. Although our model is deliberately kept simple, it still contains
several specific details, which are introduced below, where we proceed from producers
over consumers to a description of the financial institutions in each country.
Production. Each commodity yi, i = 1, 2, is produced separately in a constant-
returns-to-scale technology using the two production factors z1 and z2 as inputs; the
technology of a firm producing commodity i (available to producers in all countries) is
given by production functions
yi = τifi(z1i, z2i);
here τi is a random variable which for simplicity is assumed to take only two values,
namely τi = 1 (“success”) or τi = 0 (“failure”). The production functions fi are assumed
to satisfy the usual conditions of monotonicity, continuity and quasi-concavity.
We assume that there is a continuum of firms in each country. The firms choosing
to operate in industry i are connected in chunks or “conglomerates” of size 1, for which
the random variables are perfectly correlated, whereas the random shocks are uncorrelated
between conglomerates. We may think of the conglomerates as industrial centers which
are subject to the same random disturbance; the construction is made to allow for choice of
technique without introducing nonconvexities which may prevent existence of equilibria.
The size of the productive sector in country h is nh ∈ N, h = 1, 2, 3, representing the
endowment with entrepreneurial skills of this country; individual firms are indiced by the
letter ν.
Production is assumed to be time-consuming, so that inputs are chosen at time t = 0,
while output is obtained at time t = 1. Firms are owned by consumer-entrepreneurs in
the country who hold no other endowments, so that the purchase of inputs at t = 0 has
to be financed by credits, to which we return shortly. We assume that the choice of the
entrepreneur also involves the industry in which to produce; thus, in our model, firms may
engage in production of any of the two commodities; however, the total number of firms in
the country, nh, is assumed fixed, determined by the availability of entrepreneurial skills
in the country.
Consumption. Consumers that are not entrepreneurs will be referred to in the sequel
as “factor owners”; they have an endowment ω = (ω1, ω2) (the same for all) of factors of
production. Consumption takes place only at t = 1, so consumers sell their endowment
to the firms at t = 0 and save the income using the available financial institutions. We
assume that all consumers (entrepreneurs as well as factor owners) have identical von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u(x1, x2) depending on the consumption of the
two commodities (at t = 1), and homogeneous of degree one. At t = 1, consumers dispose
of their incomes, which are either derived from profits of firms or are repayments of the
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savings, in order to buy the two commodities at (state dependent) prices (p1, p2) which
are the same in all countries (free trade of commodities is assumed throughout). Since
factor owners in any country differ only in endowments, and since they have homogeneous
utility functions, by a classical aggregation result, the aggregate behavior is the same as if
there was only one factor owner in each country, which we assume in the sequel.
Financial intermediation. In order to link consumer savings with firms’ borrowing,
we need a financial intermediary. We assume that these financial intermediaries take the
form of coalitions of borrowers (firms), issuing bonds at repayment rate Rhi , depending on
country h and industry i; thus, bonds can be distinguished only by these characteristics,
not by the individual debtors.
Since we deal with a model where production is subject to random shocks, the
individual borrower may at t = 1 be unable to fulfill the obligations contracted at t = 0.
Since we restrict ourselves to a two-period model, where the financial intermediaries cease
to exist at t = 1, we assume that the shocks are reflected in the payoffs to the holders of
bonds, so that if only a fraction ehi of the total number of firms in country h, industry i,
succeed in producing nonzero output, then the return on the bond is ehi Rhi . This feature
makes the bonds of our model look somewhat unusual, but basically we are only taking
into account the possibility of default on bonds.
Equilibrium. We have now outlined our model and may proceed to describe equilibria
in this model. The equilibrium conditions must specify individual optimizing behaviour
by consumers and firms (or, equivalently, by factor owners and entrepreneurs), together
with clearing of markets for factors, commodities, and bonds; finally, there is an additional
condition related to the number of firms in any industry and country. We start with a more
informal description of the details and then give the precise definition.
By the nature of the uncertainty in our model, there is a finite set of possible states of
nature at t = 0, characterized by the value of τi at each chunk [0, 1], ]1, 2], . . . , ]nh−1, nh]
of potential enterprises in industry i of country h, i = 1, 2, h = 1, 2, 3. The actual
distribution of enterprises among industries is denoted n = (nh1 , nh2 )3h=1. Given this
structure, the factor owner faces the problem of choosing an optimal portfolio of bonds,
so that expected utility of the bundles bought using the bond yield is maximal. If factor
prices at t = 0 are (qh1 , qh2 ) and commodity prices at t = 1 and in state s are (p1(s), p2(s)),
then the problem to be solved by the factor owner in country h is to choose consumption
bundles (x1(s), x2(s)), for all s ∈ S, portfolio weights θhi for bonds of type (h, i), and
savings sh such that
max Eu(xh1 (s), x
h
2 (s))
subject to
p1(s)x1(s) + p2(s)x2(s) ≤ sh
3∑
h=1
2∑
i=1
θhi [e
h
i (s)R
h
i ], s ∈ S,
sh ≤ qh1 ωh1 + qh2 ωh2 .
(1)
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For the entrepreneur, the problem to be solved is similar to (1), only here the income
used for buying commodities at t = 1 and in state s is obtained not from bond yields but
from the profits of operating the firm. Thus, the entrepreneur operating firm ν of industry
i in country h has to choose inputs (zhi1, zhi2) at time t = 0 and consumption bundles
(xhi1(s), x
h
i2(s)) solving
max Eu(xhi1(s), x
h
i2(s))
subject to
p1(s)xi1(s) + p2(s)xi2(s) ≤
max{0, τiνfi(zhi1, zhi2)−Rhi (qh1 zhi1 + qh2 zhi2)},
(2.i)
where the numbering (2.i) has been used to stress that the problem described relates to
industry i. It should be noticed that the problem to be solved is the same for all firms in
industry i and the solution is therefore independent of ν; we denote by Uhi the optimal
value of the objective function in (2.i).
Given factor supply in each country as described by (1), commodity demand at t = 1
and s ∈ S as defined by (1) and (2), and commodity supply as determined by factor inputs
and random shocks, there is equilibrium if (a) supply equals demand in each market (factor
markets at t = 0 and commodity markets at t = 1, s ∈ S), and, furthermore if (b) the
industry chosen by each firm is the best possible, that is the one which gives the maximal
expected utility of final consumption as described in (2.i).
Now we may summarize the above discussion in the following definition.
Definition 1. An array
(n, (xh(s))s∈S , (zhi , (x
h
i (s))s∈S)
2
i=1, q
h, πh)3h=1, (p(s))s∈S)
is an equilibrium if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) for the factor owner of country h, (xh(s))s∈S solves the problem (1),
(2) for each entrepreneur in industry i of country h, (zhi , (xhi (s))s∈S) solves the problem
(2.i), yielding the optimal value Uhi ,
(3) for each country h,
2∑
i=1
nhi z
h
i = ω
h
and for each state s ∈ S,
3∑
h=1
[xhi (s) + n
h
i x
h
i (s)] =
3∑
h=1
∫ nhi
0
τiνfi(zhi ) dν, i = 1, 2,
(4) for each h, (nh1 , nh2 ) maximizes λ1Uh1 + λ2Uh2 over all (λ1, λ2) ∈ R2+ with
λ1 + λ2 = nh.
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Since the equilibrium even in this model, even with our simple structure of identical
consumers and producers, is quite complex, the existence problem is nontrivial and needs
to be addressed. We present the existence result below; its proof is given in an appendix
to the paper.
Theorem 1. Assume that in the model introduced above, the following assumptions are
satisfied:
(1) the common von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u is continuous, monoto-
nous, quasi-concave, and homogeneous of degree one,
(2) the production functions fi are continuous, monotonous, and concave.
Then there exists an equilibrium.
Moreover, if both industries operate in each country, then their bond repayment rates
are equal.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix. Since the model is constructed
using standard assumptions, the crucial assumptions are those which take care of the
particular features introduced, in particular the perfect foresight of future prices, which to
be meaningful presupposes uniqueness of equilibrium prices in each period 2 state, which
also figures among our assumptions.
Since bond repayment rates depend only on countries and not on industries, we may
suppress reference to industry in the sequel.
We pause briefly at this point to consider the case of constant returns to scale in
production. In that case, expected profits are 0 in equilibrium, and as a consequence the
structure of trade will resemble that of the classical Heckscher-Ohlin model.
3. The case of constant returns to scale in production
If production functions exhibit constant returns to scale, then the producers’ choices
of optimal levels of inputs – and hence of credits – becomes somewhat simpler to analyze.
It seems natural that this case is used as a starting point, even if – as it will emerge from the
analysis – the conclusions are not as immediately appealing as with the decreasing returns
to scale.
The key to the results which we obtain under this assumption on the technologies is
given by the following simple observation, formulated as a lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume that the production functions f1, f2 are positively homogeneous of
degree one. Then in equilibrium, ex ante expected profits are 0 for all active firms (that is
all firms choosing nonzero input levels).
Proof: Clearly negative expected profit implies negative expected utility, so that the firm
would prefer inaction to production. Assume that ex ante profits were positive in a firm
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of type i in country h, that is
E
[
τiνfi(zhi1, z
h
i2)−Rhi (qh1 zhi1 + qh2 zhi2)
]
> 0,
where expectation is taken over all states of nature s (which influence not only production
in the firm but also period 1 prices). Then the entrepreneur might obtain higher expected
utility (see expression (2.i) above) by increasing inputs, thus contradicting equilibrium.
Consequently, expected profits must be 0 under constant returns to scale.
While firms have identical profits, namely 0, in both industries, this does not imply
that the industry bonds have the same payoff; intuitively, the repayment rate of the
country bond of industry i reflects not only expected payoff in the industry but also
the risk. On the other hand, the case of identical repayment rates inside each country
is sufficiently interesting as a benchmark situation, since in this case the model will show
strong resemblance to the classical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of trade, displaying
factor price equalization under the usual assumptions on production technologies. We
formulate this as a proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that the production functions f1, f2 exhibit constant returns
to scale and satisfy the assumption of “no factor intensity reversal”. Assume further that
Rh1 = R
h
2 for each h, that n1 > n2 ≥ n3, and that both commodities are produced in
country 1. Then
(i) Profits are zero,
(ii) Relative factor prices are the same in all countries, and
(iii) Per capita savings in the countries are inversely proportionate to the country
bond repayment rates .
Proof: Part (i) was proved in Lemma 1. Let p1, p2 be equilibrium commodity prices,
and let R1 be the equilibrium repayment rate of country 1 bonds. For i = 1, 2, let
φi(q1, q2) = max{fi(z1, z2) | q1z1 + q2z2 = 1}
be the maximal production obtainable in industry i (before shock) using inputs of total
value 1. Since both commodities are produced in country 1, we have
E
[
p1τ1νφ1(q11 , q
1
2)
]
= E
[
p2τ2νφ2(q11 , q
1
2)
]
= R1, (3)
where q11 , q12 are the equilibrium factor prices. As in the standard proof of the factor
equalization theorem, we have that there is a unique price ratio q11/q12 such that (3) can be
satisfied.
Consider now a country h > 1. We claim that if there is a market for country h bonds,
then Rh > R1. Indeed, since country h has fewer firms than country 1, the variance of
the average output value in country 1 is smaller than that of country h, and since the risk
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averse savers buy both bonds, the repayment of the high-variance bond must be higher, so
that Rh > R1. As country h produces both commodities at factor prices (qh1 , qh2 ), we get
an expression similar to (3),
E
[
p1τ1νφ1(qh1 , q
h
2 )
]
= E
[
p2τ2νφ2(qh1 , q
h
2 )
]
= Rh. (4)
Since there can be only one value of relative factor prices such that the first equality in (4)
is satisfied, namely the ratio q11/q12 , we get statement (ii) in the theorem.
From the second equality we get that
qh1 =
R1
Rh
q11 , q
h
2 =
R1
Rh
q12 .
We conclude that the value of savings in country h satisfies
qh1 ω
h
1 + q
h
2 ω
h
2 =
Rh
R1
(q11ω
h
1 + q
1
2ω
h
2 ),
which is the third part of the theorem.
The theorem shows that under constant returns to scale – together with some standard
assumption of well-behavedness – our model yields equilibrium allocations which are not
too different from those of the classical trade models. There are, however, differences,
some of which may be rather far-reaching. For example, while the equilibria with factor
price equalization in the classical case are no different from equilibra in an integrated world
economy (cf. e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1986), this is not the case here; as a matter of
fact, such equilibria may even not be efficient, in the sense that world allocation may be
changed in a way increasing the utility of everybody.
We show this in the example below; here the riskiness of production differs between
industries, so that a country which has many resources but few firms would benefit from
specializing in producing the low-risk output. This feature is however not sustained in
equilibrium.
Example 1. Assume that the production functions are given by
f1(z1, z2) = z
1
3
1 z
2
3
2 , f2(z1, z2) = z
2
3
1 z
1
3
2 ,
and that the three countries have aggregate endowments ω1 = (2, 2) ω2 = ω3 = (1, 1).
Period 1 utility is
u(x1, x2) = x
1
2
1 x
1
2
2 .
There is a single firm of each type in country 3, whereas there are many firms in both
country 1 and 2.
It may easily be verified that in this symmetric model, in the absence of shocks there is
an equilibrium where each country inserts 1/3 of its endowment of the first factor and 2/3
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of the second in production of commodity 1, and the rest in the production of commodity
2. Without shocks, world production is (4a, 4a) with a = 132
2
3 ∼ 0.53.
We now add assumption on the random shocks in production, namely that they occur
only in the production of commodity 1; to simplify computations, we assume that the
production function has the form
y1 = τ2z
1
3
1 z
2
3
2
where τ takes the values 0 and 1 with probability 1/2 each. Since there are many firms in
countries 1 and 2, we may assume that the production function is the same as considered
above in the deterministic setup. In country 3, production of commodity 1 is either 0 or
twice the amount produced in the other countries with the same input combination.
Using the zero profit condition, we get that the input allocation considered above is
still sustained in an equilibrium. Since the variance of country 3 investment is higher than
that of the two other countries, factor remuneration is lower, even though relative factor
prices remain unchanged.
The allocation is not ex ante efficient, however. It may be improved if country 3
withdraws completely from producing commodity 1, specializing in the production of the
riskfree commodity 2. This will eliminate production risk, obviously at the cost of some
production efficiency. However, if consumers are sufficiently risk averse, there will be an
overall gain from this change.
In our model, the new allocation, with complete specialization of e.g. countries 2
and 3 in the production of commodities 1 and 2, is also an equilibrium allocation, now
sustained by relative factor prices which differ significantly among countries. Moving
somewhat ahead of our story, we note however that in our particular case, the inefficiency
comes from the lack of firms in country 3 as compared to the factor endowment; if country
2 firms can establish themselves in country 3 – possibly as a result of economic integration
opening up for direct foreign investment – then the original allocation where every country
produces the commodities in the same ratio will be efficient, thus providing an example
of an advantageous integration (between two of the three countries).
4. The case of decreasing returns to scale
In the previous section, we assumed constant returns to scale in production; this case
is somewhat simpler to analyze than the general case of non-increasing returns to scale,
but it does not produce all the features that we are interested in, since incomes are derived
only from ownership of factors of production, not from entrepreneurship. To have positive
profits in firms, we need non-increasing returns to scale. Therefore we assume from now
on that each fi is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave.
Under decreasing returns to scale, entrepreneurial profits are non-zero in equilibrium
if there is non-zero production; indeed, at any level of production, marginal expected
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revenue exceeds average expected revenue. Once firms earn non-zero profits, we have an
additional source of income.
Example 2. As in Example 1, we assume that countries have proportional factor
endowments (no traditional comparative advantages) but differ in the characteristics
affecting country risk; the only new feature of the present case is that production functions
are concave, with the form
f1(z1, z2) = v
(
z
1
6
1 z
1
3
2
)
, f2(z1, z2) = v
(
z
1
3
1 z
1
6
2
)
,
where v : R+ → R+ is an increasing concave transformation, that is v is C2 with v(0) = 0,
0 ≤ v′ < 1 and v′′ < 0. We assume again that the random shock affects only one of the
industries, and that the probability of 0 outcome in any firm is 1/2. Similarly, we assume
that there are many firms in country 1 and 2, and few in country 3; in the present case,
we need however to specify the actual numbers, which are set to 40 in country 1, 20 in
country 2, and 2 in country 3.
We start by considering the case of no random disturbances, where classical trade
theory applies. Then factor proportions are 1:3 in the first and 3:1 in the second industry
(independent of the level of activity); lowest cost of production in each country is obtained
by dividing the relevant input combination equally among firms of each type, and due to
the symmetry of the example, there should be the same number of firms operating in each
industry. Thus, in countries 1 and 2, each firm in indutry 1 uses 1/30 and 2/30 of the total
country endowment of factor 1 and 2, respectively (since there are 20 firms in this industry
sharing endowment (2/3, 4/3) in country 1, 10 firms sharing (1/3, 2/3) in country 2),
wheras firms in industry 2 use 2/30 and 1/30. Output per firm is v( 110α), where as before
α =
1
3
2
2
3 ,
and total output in the two countries is found by multiplying by the number of firms in
each industry. In country 3 with only one firm, total output is v(α).
We note that due to decreasing returns to scale, total output could be increased either
if production factors could be moved from country 3 to country 1 or 2, or if firms from these
countries could operate in country 3 instead of the home country. This type of inefficiency
on world scale is caused by the restrictions on movements of factors and firms and will
occur also in traditional trade models; it is not related to the presence of uncertainty.
Since the symmetric allocation described above is efficient (under the given restric-
tions), it may be achieved as an equilibrium for suitable consumer preferences, for example
if their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are symmetric in the two consumption
goods. In this case, expected profits will be equal in the two industries so that no firm has
an incentive to change its industry of operation.
Adding now random shocks in the production of commodity 1, we get as in Example 1
that country 3 bonds must have a higher repayment rate to offset the difference in variance
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as compared to the bonds of the other countries. However, the idea of improving world
allocation by specialization of country 3 in the production of commodity 2 needs some
qualification, since now the decreased volatility of output has to be balanced against the
loss of productivity, since the single firm in country 3, which was already “too big” in the
initial equilibrium, has now doubled its inputs. Thus, the advantages of integration have
to be balanced against disadvantages arising from other sources.
Under decreasing returns to scale, entrepreneurial profits play a role, and their relative
size will depend on the level of activity in the firms of the country. The presence of nonzero
entrepreneurial remunerations is a feature which will play an important role when we turn
to the effects of economic integration.
5. Advantageous and disadvantageous integrations
Having developed the model in the course of the two previous sections, we may now
put it to the use for which it was designed, as outlined in the introduction, namely that of
economic integration, partial or full. In our model with unrestricted free trade in output
commodities, economic integration must take one of the following forms:
(1) integrated factor markets (“unrestricted movement of factors of production”),
(2) integrated financial markets (one common bond, and consequently one repay-
ment rate, for the countries involved), and
(3) right of establishing a firm in any of the countries involved.
While the first two aspects of economic integration may suggest themselves from the
very logic of this (and other) models of international trade, the third form of economic
integration may indeed be much closer to real world phenomena. Indeed, the typical
result of closer economic cooperation, as experienced e.g. in the European Union, is that
production is moved from countries with high factor prices to low cost countries, while
the basic structure of the firm, including its methods of obtaining finance for investments,
is retained. In the following, we concentrate on this type of economic integration which
is little investigated in the literature and which also produces some rather striking results.
Thus, in the following we mean integration of type (3) whenever we speak about economic
integration.
Formally, if countries h and k belong to a group of countries having chosen to integrate
their economies, then any firm of country h may choose to operate in country k (and vice
versa). Given such a choice, the firm will use the bond market of its country of origin and
the factor market in the country of operation. Consequently, we use double index hk for
the variables pertaining to such a firm.
Economic integration understood as perfect firm mobility makes it possible for a firm
to exploit differences in credit availability and in factor price levels: If its home country
has a large number of firms, and consequently small variance in output, its firms have
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access to credit with low rate of repayment. Moving to a country with fewer firms and
more expensive credits, it can offer the factor owners of that country better prices than the
domestic firms. This will wipe out the domestic firms, so that entrepreneurship and the
profits which are derived from it is transferred from the small country to the large one,
producing a case of disadvantageous economic integration.
Proposition 2. Assume that the large country 1 and one of the small countries h are
integrated. If the probability of failure is non-zero in both industries and the ratio n1/nh
is sufficiently large, then in the integrated equilibrium, the following holds:
(i) (zhk1 , zhk2 ) = 0 for k = 1, h (firms with origin in country h do not produce),
(ii) (qh1 , qh2 ) = (q11 , q12) (factor prices are equalized between the two countries),
(iii) if countries have proportional factor endowments, then expected world produc-
tion has decreased and its volatility has increased.
Proof: If a firm belonging to country h operates in country h, then its marginal cost at
(0, 0) equals expected marginal revenue. Clearly, marginal cost of the firm with origin in
h exceeds that of the firm from country 1 by a factor Rhi /R1i . Since this factor depends on
the relative volatility of output in the respective countries, it grows beyond limits as n1/nh
increases. Since the marginal productivities are upper bounded at 0, we get that marginal
cost will exceed marginal expected revenue for large enough n1/nh, and (i) follows.
To see that (ii) holds, we need only notice that the firms of country 1 now have
access to the aggregate factor endowment of country 1 and h, and since n1 is large, there
is no problem of indivisibility of firms, meaning that the firms may choose to establish
in countries 1 and h in such a way as to realize a cost minimum for producing total
output, meaning that production and consumption takes place as if the countries were fully
integrated into one. As a consequence, factor prices are indeed equal.
For (iii), we notice that since integration results in fewer firms, equilibrium input per
firm has increased, meaning that expected output decreases due to decreasing returns to
scale. The increased volatility is also an obvious (but possibly surprising) consequence of
the reduction of the number of operating firms.
The welfare reducing effects of integration obtained in the Proposition should not
be generalized beyond the setup for which it was derived; we considered a case where
countries were similar in the traditional sense of no comparative advantages in factor
endowments. Such comparative advantages might well lead to different results, since the
integrated use of ressources might outweigh the decrease in output and the increase in risk
due to smaller number of productive units.
Even in the case covered by the Proposition, we cannot be sure whether the gains or
losses are spread evenly or unevenly among countries, since the loss of entrepreneurial
income in country h is partially offset by better remuneration of factors. That the latter
effect is not always big enough can be seen from the next example.
Example 3. We use here the model considered in Example 2, with random shocks now
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affecting the production of both commodities in the same way, and with consumers having
utility functions that are symmetric in the consumption of the two goods. We consider an
economic integration between countries 1 and 3; this means that firms of both countries
can establish production in any of the two countries. By Proposition 1 we obtain that
country 3 firms must be inactive, so that all incomes in country 3 are derived from sale of
factor endowment.
Whether country 3 as a whole has become better off as a result of the arrangement
depends therefore on the increase in factor prices. We can check what happens in our
simple model; here we assume a very specific functional form of v, namely
v(r) = min{a + br, cr},
where a, b, c > 0, b < 1, c > 1, and a < 110α (here α is the parameter used in Examples 2
and 3). Thus, the concave transformation v is the minimum of two affine functions, having
a kink at the value r¯ = (c− b)/a.
Since the two commodities enter the utility function in symmetrical way and their
production is open to the same kind of random shocks, the allocation of factors of
production will be the same as with no uncertainty, with the difference that there are
now 10 firms operating in each country (all of which have their origin in country 1).
Each of these produce v
(
1
10α
)
of the relevant commodity; if r¯ is small enough, more
specifically if r¯ ≤ 110α, then marginal products and hence factor prices remain constant at
input levels equal to and above those of the equilibrium, including the level corresponding
to pre-integration production in the firms of country 3. Consequently, factor remuneration
does not change, whereas entrepreneurial profits disappear in country 3 after integration,
and it follows that the country has become worse off.
While in our examples disadvantageous integration occurs due to differences in
country risk, we may similarly encounter cases of advantageous integration when country
risk is of comparable size.
Example 4. To give an example of advantageous integration, we modify the previous
example by setting the number of firms of each type to 1, so that countries 2 and 3
become absolutely identical. However, integration makes specialization possible: Each
country may specialize in a particular industry, in the sense that its firms produce only
one commodity, with one of them operating in the other country in order to use the factor
endowments efficiently. This will reduce country risk in each industry, allowing for cheaper
credit, larger production, and a greater profit share in both countries.
Summing up, in the model considered the preconditions for successful integration
(where integration is considered as free choice of localization of the firms of the countries
involved) is that the partners must not be too unequal, since the economically stronger
part – where strength is measured as availability of entrepreneurial skills – will reap the
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benefits while the weaker part may suffer a loss. On the other hand, integration of the
small countries may be beneficial to all countries involved.
If the final goal is a fully integrated world economy, it may be argued that the path
towards this goal, whether achieved through integrating weak countries with the strong
country one by one or integrating the weak countries first and then proceed to the final full
integration, must be of minor importance, and indeed this is the case in our model, where
the equilibria in the fully integrated economy are independent of the way in which the
integration was achieved. On the other hand, only small changes are needed for this path
to make a difference: If we assume that firms which do not produce cannot be opened again,
then indeed the approach to world integration will matter very much, giving preference to
the integration of countries of equal economic development rather than of countries with
differing economic potential. A full treatment of a model where the number of firms in
each country is subject to change is however beyond the scope of this paper.
6. Concluding comments
In the model considered in the previous sections, we have analyzed the patterns
of trade and the results of economic integration in a simple world with three countries
producing two commodities from two factors. The initial situation was one of liberalized
commodity trade. This does not however mean that there is no scope for further integration
of economic activity. Once we add uncertainty, even in its simplest possible form, namely
as an output shock acting independently on each firm, we may consider more or less
liberalized regimes of investment financing, and we may consider the possibility of a firm
operating in another country, the latter being one of the most widespread real world features
of economic integration, encountered in the movement of several industries from North to
South in the European Union as well as the maquiladores industries in Mexico following
after the NAFTA agreement.
The paper sets out to analyze the workings of this type of integration in a context
of standard trade theory, minimally extended so that questions of financing investment
and change of localization of firms make sense. It should of course. Also, an underlying
assumption is that all investment must be financed via the bond market, with no possibility
of state-dependent contracting.
Given these shortcomings, it is however worth noticing that the results of the models
are quite different from those of standard trade theory, since welfare gains are to be expected
when countries are not too different and losses, at least for the weaker part, in the case
where the countries are very different. This may be reassuring in view of the stylized
facts about trade which seems to be flourishing more between equals than between very
different countries, cf. the early contribution by Burenstam Linder (1961), but it should
be remembered that we are considering gains and losses relative to a situation of perfectly
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liberalized commodity trade.
The impacts for current international economic cooperation would be that this should
be encouraged particularly for similar countries, while there is reason for some scepticism
as to the benefits of integration between unequal partners. Whether this recommendation
is valid in a more general, and therefore more realistic setting, is however something which
has yet to be investigated.
7. Mathematical appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we give a proof of the existence of equilibria in our basic model, as
stated in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let N be the set of all arrays n = (nh1 , nh2 )3h=1 with nhi ∈ Z+
and nh1 + nh2 = nh. The set of allocations (xh(s))s∈S , (zhi , (xhi (s))s∈S)2i=1) which may
occur in an equilibrium is bounded, so performing a standard truncation operation on
feasible sets we may assume that each factor owner chooses final consumption from the
set X1 = ([0, M ]2)S and each entrepreneur chooses from X2 = ([0, M ]2×X1. We denote
by Θ the set of all portfolio weights (θh1 , θh2 )3h=1. We construct a family of correspondences
as follows:
For each country h, the demand correspondence of the factor owner ξh0 : R2+ ×
[0, M ]6× (R2+)S → X1×Θ assigns to each array (qh, (Rh1 , Rh2 )3h=1, (p(s))s∈S) of factor
prices, bond rates, and state-dependent commodity prices the solution to the consumer’s
problem (1). This correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty, compact and
convex values.
For each country h and industry i we similarly define the demand correspondence ξhij :
R
2
+ × [0, M ]6 × (R2+)S → X2 by assigning to each array (qh, (Rh1 , Rh2 )3h=1, (p(s))s∈S)
the solution of problem (2.i). Again, each φhi is upper hemicontinuous with compact and
convex values.
To obtain market clearing prices, we define price correspondences ψh for each
country h and commodity price correspondences ψ[s] for each state s as follows: For
each allocation ξ = ((xh(s))s∈S , (zhi , (xhi (s))s∈S)2i=1)3h=1, let
ψ(ξ) =
{
((q˜h)3h=1, p˜(s)s∈S) ∈ R6+ × (R2+)S
∣∣∣ q˜h · [ 2∑
i=1
nhi z
h
i − ωh
]
> 0, h = 1, 2, 3,
p˜(s) ·
3∑
h=1
[
xh + (nh1x
h
1 , n
h
2x
h
2 )−
( ∫ nh1
0
τ1νf1(zh1 ) dν,
∫ nh2
0
τ2νf2(zh2 ) dν
)]
> 0, s ∈ S,
3∑
i=1
(q˜h1 + q˜
h
2 ) +
∑
s∈S
(p1(s) + p2(s)) = 1,
}
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then ψ has open graph and convex (possibly empty) values.
The next correspondence serves to set the repayment rates Rhi ; define α as the
correspondence taking portfolio weights θ = (θhi ) and allocations into possible bond
repayments,
α(ξ, θ) =
{
(R˜h1 , R˜
h
2 )
3
h=1
∣∣∣ 3∑
h=1
2∑
i=1
R˜hi [θ
h
i s
h − qh · (nh1zh1 , nh2zh2 )] > 0
}
.
Again, α has open graph and convex, possibly empty values.
The final correspondence is used for obtaining the equilibrium choice of n: For each
allocation ξ, denote by Uh1 (ξ) and Uh2 (ξ) the expected utility of the factor owner and the
entrepreneur in country h, and let βh(n, ξ) be given by
βh(n, ξ) = {(λh1 , λh2 ) ∈ R3+ | λh1Uh1 + λh2Uh2 > nh1Uh1 + nh2Uh2 , λh1 + λh2 = nh}.
As before, β has open graph and convex, possibly empty values.
Now we collect all the above correspondences into one correspondence ψ which takes
allocation-price pairs
χ = (((xh(s))s∈S , θh, (zhi , (x
h
i (s))s∈S)
2
i=1, q
h, (Rh1 , R
h
2 ))
3
h=1, (p(s))s∈S)
into themselves; here the allocation components of φ are given by the correspondences
ψh0 for commodity and portfolio demand of factor owners, ψhi for the demand for factors
and commodities of entrepreneurs, ψh for factor prices, ψ[s] for commodity prices in
state s, α for bond repayment rates, and β for . The components of ψn are either upper
hemicontinuous with closed, convex and nonempty values, or they have open graph and
convex values.
We now apply the fixed point theorem used in Gale and Mas-Colell (1975) to give
the existence of an allocation-price pair
χˆn = (((xˆh(s))s∈S , θˆh, (zˆhi , (xˆ
h
i (s))s∈S)
2
i=1, qˆ
h, (Rˆh1 , Rˆ
h
2 ))
3
h=1, (pˆ(s))s∈S , nˆ)
such that
– for each h, the choice of the factor owner in country h, (xˆh(s))s∈S , θh), belongs to
ψh0 (χˆn), meaning that it satisfies (1),
– for each country h, industry i and firm j, (zˆhij , (xˆhij(s))s∈S) belongs to φhij(ξˆn), so
that it satisfies (2.i); it follows now that
– since the solutions to (1) and (2.i) satisfy Walras’ law, we have that
((qˆh)3h=1, (pˆ(s))s∈S) /∈ ψ(χˆn),
so that ψ(χˆn) = ∅, which gives that demand does not exceed supply in any factor or
commodity market;
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– similarly we have that α(χˆn) = ∅, so that loans in country h, industry i do not exceed
demand for bonds of this type, and
– β(nˆ, χˆ) = ∅.
It is easily checked that the allocation-price pair with all these properties is an
equilibrium, and we have thereby showed that equilibria exist.
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